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Mini roundup of Texas election law stories

1. Voter Registration — Status of TCRP Suit To Enforce Federal Motor Voter Laws

We’re approaching the one-year anniversary of the Texas Civil Rights Project’s lawsuit against the Texas Department of Public Safety, and just to refresh you, here’s what’s going on:

  • Texas provides a website portal for the online renewal of drivers’ licenses, which should in theory also allow voters to easily update their voter registration.
  • BUT … for voters who have moved from one Texas county to another, online renewal carries pitfalls, including unexpected “gotcha” cancellations of existing voter registration status, and confusing or misleading information about how voter registration renewal works.
  • Thousands of Texas voters have unwittingly had their voter registrations cancelled when they attempted to update their status online.
  • Recently, the State of Texas was sanctioned by a federal district court for unconscionable delays in responding to the plaintiff’s discovery requests.
  • The trial is scheduled to take place this Ssummer.

2. Department of Justice Shifts to the State’s Side on Texas Voter ID Suit

  • In a February 28 interview with the Texas Standard, (link to audio here: http://www.texasstandard.org/stories/justice-department-drops-opposition-to-texas-voter-id-law), election law expert Richard Hasen discussed the decision by the U.S. Department of Justice to end its legal opposition to the Texas Voter I.D. law.
  • With Jeff Sessions in charge at the Department of Justice, and with anticipated conservative justices appointed to the U.S. Supreme Court, the position of the plaintiffs is now more precarious.
  • This follow-up story from Slate covered the most recent trial court hearing; the plaintiffs described the judge as skeptical of the State’s argument.

3. Regional Briefs

  • Voter assistance or improper electioneering in Robstown, Texas? – KRISTV (the NBC affiliate TV station in Corpus Christi) has this interesting story about a candidate who was elected to a local utility district seat in November after assisting voters with their ballots.
    • In response to the argument that the candidate’s presence in the polling place constituted electioneering, the city manager pointed out that voters who are unable to read or mark a ballot are legally permitted to ask for and receive polling place assistance from a candidate.
  • Errors in 2016 election likely the result of voter confusion, not intentional fraud –
    • This story from Mysanantonio.com expresses the position of Bexar County election officials that to the extent voters with photo I.D.s may have completed affidavits alleging a lack of sufficient I.D. prior to voting, the erroneous use of the affidavits was likely a consequence of the confusing shifts in state voter I.D. procedures that were rolled out just prior to the November 2016 election, and not reflective of a pattern of intentional voter fraud.

Heel Turn—DOJ Files For Continuance In Texas Voter ID Case

As reported on CNN and as analyzed by Rick Hasen’s Election Blog, the U.S. Department of Justice has asked for an extension in trial court briefing deadlines in the Texas voter ID lawsuit due to a change in the federal administration.

The common-sense interpretation of this procedural move (as expressed by Professor Hasen)?:

DOJ will switch sides and join the State of Texas in arguing in favor of more restrictive voting requirements. More to come.

Some thoughts on the eve of oral argument in Veasey v. Perry

As you may know, tomorrow (April 28), a three-judge panel of the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals in New Orleans will hear oral argument in Veasey v. Perry. Texas has appealed the trial court’s damning conclusion that the State had used its voter I.D. law to enact a deliberately racially discriminatory barrier to voting.

Back in March, as the April 1, 2015 deadline for its reply brief loomed, the State asserted that it would only need 11,500 words to successfully argue that its draconian picture I.D. law wasn’t targeting minorities. After all, it wouldn’t take much paper to say that Texas’ voter I.D. law is more universally and generally horrible than merely racist. It doesn’t just discriminate against protected racial and language minority groups – it also discriminates against elderly voters, student voters, the poor, voters with disabilities, and inconveniences or hinders voting in general for everyone.

And there’s the State’s argument on appeal – which I shall broadly and meanly paraphrase as follows. “This law is so bad, it can’t possibly have been motivated by mere racial animus. We just hate all voters.” (That’s actually the second part of the State’s argument. The first part is, “well … all the people who were disenfranchised should have just voted by mail.” Unfortunately for the State, that’s a terrible argument, in part because it violates equal-rights provisions of the 14th Amendment. In fact, it’s such a self-destructive “shot in the foot” argument that everyone else feels a little sorry for the State’s litigators for being forced to repeat it. I mean … they do know that equating voting by mail with in-person voting is sort-of cringe inducingly bad form in civil rights litigation, right?)

Embarrassingly, the powers-that-be at the Texas Solicitor-General’s office dawdled a bit over the crafting of their succinct brief, and accidentally filed it a few minutes after midnight on April 2nd. These things happen, and nobody (other than me) felt particularly inclined to capitalize on the minor technical error in order to gently ridicule the already hapless appellant.

Ha ha.

On a more serious note, people interested in same-day coverage of tomorrow’s oral argument should contact Erik Opsal at the Brennan Center.

Erik Opsal
Communications Manager
646.292.8356
erik.opsal@nyu.edu

Finally, for a nice perspective on why the international reputation of the United States currently hangs in the balance over voting rights, here’s a nice paper by Patricia Broussard, published as part of a recent symposium on the Voting Rights Act conducted by the Journal of Race, Gender and Ethnicity. “Eviscerating the Voting Rights Act and Moral Authority: Freedom to Discriminate Comes With a Price” (Journal of Race, Gender and Ethnicity, Volume 7, No. 1, Fall 2015)

Reading the tea leaves – what do recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions bode for Texas elections?

Within the past week, the U.S. Supreme Court refused to grant certiori to hear an appeal of a decision upholding Wisconsin’s appalling voter i.d. law, (Frank v. Walker) and just remanded two Alabama redistricting cases (Alabama Black Legislative Caucus et al.  v. Alabama et al., linked with Alabama Democratic Conference et al., v. Alabama et al.) back to the lower courts on a 5-4 decision holding that the state legislature could not justify “packing” African-American voters into fewer districts on the basis that it was compelled to do so in order to comply with Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.

Superficially, this seemed to be a bit of give-and-take when it came to voting rights, although the cases weren’t directly comparable on the facts or issues.

So, what do these decisions mean for (1) the Texas voter i.d. case (Veasey et al. v. Perry et al.), or (2) the Texas redistricting case (Perez et al. v. Texas)?

Answer: Not much either way. The Texas Legislature (bless its aggregated shriveled dignity) overreached far more aggressively on both voter i.d. laws and on redistricting than did any of the other states (with the possible exception of South Carolina, which seems to be giving us a run for the money on efforts to cement the title of “most regressed” when it comes to voting rights).

As a consequence, the Texas lawsuits present voting rights advocates with an interesting set of tactical choices. On the one hand, the State has been such a bad actor that it is absolutely imperative that its voter i.d. and 2013 redistricting be struck down in the Supreme Court as unconstitutional, and that its future actions be subjected to “opt-in” preclearance under Section 3 of the Voting Rights Act.

On the other hand, because Texas pushed the envelope on bad legislative acts, the State provided some cover for other states involved in similar lawsuits. It’s sometimes handy to be able to point to another entity and say, “Well, at least our state government didn’t try something on the order of what Texas did!”

In the case of the Wisconsin litigation, the plaintiffs lacked sufficient evidence of malicious racial intent to invoke key provisions of the Voting Rights Act. In the case of the Alabama litigation, the plaintiffs prevailed only in knocking back a couple of fairly tenuous legal arguments justifying racial gerrymandering.

In the Texas litigation, the stakes are much higher, and the evidence for racial animus is much stronger. As for me, I just hope that the Supreme Court fixes the Texas mistakes. As much as I might hope that Justice Roberts would have a change of heart regarding the importance of the Voting Rights Act for the country as a whole, I really just want some acknowledgment that there are fact patterns so egregious that they can embarrass even a few hard-core states-rightists.

v

Texas Redistricting Trial Begins; GöPerdämmerung: Twilight of the Grumpy White Legislators

Well, really, it’s not likely to have the same oomph as fire-breathing dragons, magic rings, and valkyries, but an election law blogger can hope, right? Today the big Texas redistricting trial kicks off with a bang.

When the Department of Justice intervened in Perez v. Perry et al., the pleading (bolstered by the evidence admitted in the Section 5 preclearance lawsuit that Texas had brought in the D.C. District Court) did a pretty good job of describing how the Texas Legislature showed discriminatory intent with respect to minority voting rights (see http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/sec_2/perez_intervention.pdf.) Of all the smoking guns, the most damning one is probably the November 17, 2010 email in which GOP attorney Eric Opiela asked for demographic data in order to pack and crack Hispanic voting districts (as summarized in this timely article from Salon Magazine, at http://www.salon.com/2014/07/14/texas_gops_secret_anti_hispanic_plot_smoking_gun_emails_revealed/ ).

What Opiela (as consigliere for the Texas GOP) needed was to identify swaths of low-turnout areas with high numbers of Hispanic-surname voters who could be safely appended to GOP districts, thereby sufficiently boosting the apparent minority representation in those districts without risking the possibility that minorities might actually carry those districts.

The strategies of packing and cracking are many and varied, and can include things like (1) careful placement of prison populations (counting disproportionately minority and voting age populations as if they could vote, despite legally barring those populations from voting), (2) wildly inventive gerrymandering (diluting urban minority voting blocks), and others.

As with other pending election litigation, I must give much thanks to Moritz College of Law and its wonderful election litigation reference materials, found at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/index.php.

 

Resurrecting Submissions (But Not Preclearance) Using Title VI of the Civil Rights Act – Tracking Election Procedural Changes After Shelby County

[Reposted]

What’s Up With Shelby County v. Holder?

Most readers of this blog already know the answer to that question, but to recap — on June 25, 2013, the United States Supreme Court issued an opinion in a voting rights lawsuit involving Shelby County, Alabama, and the Attorney General of the United States. As court watchers had expected, the Supreme Court found a key section of the Voting Rights Act (Section 5) to be unconstitutional. One consequence of the decision was that a process called “preclearance” ended, meaning that as of June 25, 2013, the U.S. Department of Justice no longer reviews and approves changes in voting procedures that have been adopted in certain jurisdictions.

I think the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) has a strong and defensible statutory reason for tracking election procedures across all jurisdictions in the United States, independent of the specific requirement in Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) that covered jurisdictions had to submit changes in their voting procedures for preclearance. (For those of you asking, “What the heck is Section 5?” the Voting Section of the Civil Rights Division at DOJ has an excellent short summary of this key element of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, along with historical background.)

Mandatory Notification of Changes in Election Procedures Under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act

I propose that DOJ should promulgate some new rules that would more or less recapitulate the guidelines for preclearance submissions under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, but in the context of compliance reporting under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (hereafter “the Civil Rights Act” or “the Act.” With statutes such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964, one has to specify the date, because there are a lot of laws with the name “Civil Rights Act”).

Some explanation is in order for people who may not be familiar with how the Act is organized. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 (along with later amendments) is a breathtakingly broad and powerful response to a century’s worth of endemic racial discrimination; the Act has lots of parts that accomplish different goals, all with the objective of shutting down the often slippery and duplicitous efforts of Southern segregationists to avoid meaningful enforcement against institutional racism.

Because the Act is so large, it is broken down into smaller sections (Titles) that focus on different ways that institutional racism manifests. Title I is the “voting part” of the Civil Rights Act, but it is pretty weak — unlike the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Title I of the Civil Rights Act doesn’t get rid of tests or qualifications to vote, but just requires that such tests be applied fairly. Title II of the Civil Rights Act allows the use of court-issued injunctions against private businesses that cater to the general public but refuse service on the basis of race (examples would include restaurants or hotels that might prohibit African-Americans, or that might offer inferior or different service based on race). Title III of the Civil Rights Act accomplishes the actual desegregation of public accommodations. Title IV desegregates public education, and Title V creates the Commission on Civil Rights.

Title VI (the part of the Civil Rights Act that I’m talking about) prohibits acts of discrimination by agencies or organizations that receive federal financial assistance. I’m focusing on Title VI because that part of the law includes very broad authorization of rulemaking authority by federal agencies such as the DOJ. In terms of rulemaking, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act is very different from Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, which contains no explicit rulemaking authority.

In fact, one of the limitations of the Voting Rights Act is the incapacity of federal agencies to make use of that law to justify formal administrative enforcement. The Voting Rights Act enables access to the Federal courts in order to protect against discrimination in voting, but it doesn’t explicitly enact much in the way of non-judicial bureaucracy to enforce it.

Some of the other titles in the Civil Rights Act are famous (such as Title VII, which creates equal employment opportunities and guards against discrimination in employment), while others are less well-known (Title VIII authorizes the Commerce Department to collect statistical data on voter registration, and Title IX authorizes removal of civil rights cases from the courtrooms of segregationist Southern judges). There are other titles as well, but as I mentioned, I’m mostly interested in looking at Title VI.

Title VI of the Civil Rights Act and Part 42 of Title 28, Code of Federal Regulations

The rules that Federal agencies adopt are collected into a series of volumes entitled the “Code of Federal Regulations,” which is organized thematically into titles and sections. Title 28 of the Code of Federal Regulations contains rules promulgated by DOJ, and Part 42 of Title 28 contains DOJ rules for enforcing Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

This is where my proposed rules would logically be placed, but this is not where you would look to find the “administrative guidance” adopted by DOJ to guide entities in making submissions under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. That “guidance” (because, remember, the Voting Rights Act didn’t authorize the creation of agency rules) is found in Part 51 of Title 28.

I mention Part 51 because I freely cut and pasted huge swaths of that preclearance submission guidance into my proposed rules. That’s because I want to enrich and expand the submission process, preserving the administrative apparatus of Section 5 submission as much as possible. I don’t want to reinvent the whole thing because it’s better public policy to build off the established framework.

Thus, 28 C.F.R. Part 42 (the administrative rules promulgated by the DOJ to administer the Civil Rights Act) should be amended to include a new Subpart J (labeled beginning with Sections 42.801 through 42.826) that would recapitulate the structure and contents of the submission guidelines in 28 C.F.R. Part 51, but  exclude the enforcement provisions or selective categories of covered jurisdictions (that had previously been addressed in Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act).

Replacing “Submissions” with “Reports”

Notice the stylistic changes I made in the proposed rules. No mention is made of “submissions,” and there’s no mechanism for reviewing the “reports” that federally funded agencies must, under these proposed rules, submit to DOJ. That removal of review is intentional — no longer are jurisdictions (e.g., states, or any part of states, or any other jurisdiction) being singled out for preclearance of their voting changes. Instead, the proposed rules would compel jurisdictions to report voting changes to continue to qualify for federal funding.

Applying the “Report” Requirements to All Political Subdivisions

You’ll also notice something pretty major when you read the proposed rules. As drafted, the rules apply to all political subdivisions, not just in the South or in “trouble spots,” but everywhere. This drafting constitutes a dramatic expansion of reporting requirements, far beyond the old submission process, and it’s not accidental.

First, the expansion would enable  DOJ and Congress to acquire the hard data they need to reconfigure and revive the coverage formula in Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Second, the expansion addresses the implicit or explicit complaints of conservative critics of the Voting Rights Act, which was (in a nutshell) that the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as applied, was unfairly burdening the South in comparison to other jurisdictions, without regard to whether those other jurisdictions exhibited patterns of racist behavior.

These Rules Don’t Substitute For a Robust Voting Rights Act

I applaud efforts to fix or rehabilitate the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (and there are all sorts of good proposals, from piggybacking some new “non-binding guidance” onto Section 2 of the Act, to getting Congressional reauthorization of Section 4 with beefed-up sociological data showing that the South is still a hotbed of racial discrimination to a greater degree than are other jurisdictions. See, for example, Christopher Elmendorf and Douglas Spencer, The Geography of Discrimination in Voting: MRP Meets the VRA., UC Davis Legal Studies Research Paper Series No. 339 (May 2013). at 47.)

My proposed “reporting” rules aren’t intended to diminish or reroute efforts to restore Section 4(b) VRA covered jurisdiction formulas. If anything, the proposed rules are intended to complement, but not replace, the submission process. We still need federal preemptive blocking of  potentially discriminatory changes in voting procedures (e.g., in addition to voter ID and voter registration laws, the shortening of early voting windows and ending of Sunday voting,  distribution of polling places based on population, physical layout of polling places, and so on).

Saving the Voting Rights Act of 1965 is a big, intimidating goal, with complicated political risks. Arguably the House of Representatives has  been hijacked by extremists who have no interest in governing the country, the conservative-dominated Supreme Court has already succinctly demonstrated its bias with respect to civil rights laws, and DOJ faces having to litigate, court by court and state by state, to mitigate discriminatory election procedures.

Consider the proposed “reporting” rules as having far more modest goals. The intention here is to recreate the mechanical, or “easy,” part of the submission process while working toward other bigger and harder goals.

Why We Need Something Analogous to Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act Submissions

Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act (that is, preclearance) enabled a federal agency (the Department of Justice) to preemptively shut down state and local legislation that weakened minority voting rights. But preclearance was also a powerful statistical and data-gathering tool for policymakers and planners.

The identification of minority voting interests should be a “best practice” of legislative drafting, but such identification often isn’t done unless there is some external requirement compelling  involvement and comments from protected classes of language and racial minority groups. Preclearance submissions enforced greater care in the legislative drafting process across all covered jurisdictions.

Preclearance submissions also encouraged greater awareness by lawmakers of the geographic distribution and demographics of the voting-age population in a covered jurisdiction, and not just for purposes of planning redistricting, but also for placing polling sites and scheduling early voting. Preclearance encouraged accountability to local interests and cut down on accidental errors in voting site placement, protected against the underestimation of the level of language assistance needed in a territory, and encouraged the review and remediation of architectural barriers affecting voters with disabilities.

The administrative framework of at least the reporting part of the preclearance framework has to be rebuilt. As a nation, we can either do it now (when there’s still enough institutional memory and structure to make the process slightly less painful) or we can do it later (when it will be much more expensive and painful) after the successor to Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (in whatever form that future law may exist) finally gets passed.

It’s also time for “non-covered jurisdictions” — that is, the jurisdictions that weren’t identified by the formula for coverage in Section 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and that therefore weren’t subject to the Section 5 preclearance process  — to start getting used to the idea of tracking and reporting changes in voting procedures to the DOJ. The stated reasons for historical exemption of most non-Southern jurisdictions merely undercut the goals promoted by the Voting Rights Act, and contributed to the gutting of the law when the Supreme Court ruled that Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act was unconstitutional.

Cost Considerations and Administrative Burdens

It would be misleading to suggest that “reporting” detailed changes in voting procedures wouldn’t take any money or effort. Preclearance submissions were tedious, expensive, and time-consuming. When the Shelby County decision was handed down, we election attorneys were in some sense like kids who had been told that we had a snow day.

We were giddy with excitement that we wouldn’t have to go through the laborious process of tracking and submitting every change in voting procedures to the Voting Section of the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice. No more having to read numbing 300-page omnibus bills looking for the one section that might affect election procedures. Suddenly, rooms full of boxed manila folders were free to be used for other things. Shelby County meant no more maintenance of detailed lists of legislative materials dating back to the mid-1970s, and no more endless rounds of phone tag with legislative aides, law firms, and federal preclearance analysts. It would be fair to say we were delighted.

That was what the atmosphere felt like in the Elections Division at the Texas Secretary of State’s office, even among attorneys who were philosophically predisposed to support the Voting Rights Act. I suspect it was the mood elsewhere, given that the immediate practical effect of the verdict in Shelby County v. Holder was the dismantling of a decades-long structure of administrative guidance and office practices to support regular written submissions of detailed dossiers on changes in election procedures. Money that would otherwise have gone toward the Section 5 submission industry was saved for other uses.

I don’t doubt that Shelby County cut down on the billable hours at law firms representing political subdivisions subject to the Section 5  preclearance requirements, shifted the workload of preclearance analysts at DOJ, and cleared out file rooms across the Deep South.

For all I know, the civil servants at DOJ also treated the end of preclearance as a holiday — the administration of preclearance certainly cost money and time for DOJ as well as for the states. Analysts at DOJ would describe the Texas submissions file room (a few years ago, a DOJ analyst told me that Texas alone accounted for half of the submissions received by DOJ each year) as a cramped warren of buckling, teetering towers of cardboard boxes stacked floor to ceiling. Not surprisingly, the staff at the Voting Section of the Civil Rights Division seemed to dread the labor associated with retrieving a specific file from the unruly mess.

But just as every snow day must eventually be made up, our vacation from the mechanical tedium of tracking and reporting changes in voting procedures needs to end. It’s time to get back to work.

Despite the practical unpleasantness and cost involved, I think it is still the case that the reestablishment of some archive of procedural changes in election administration is cheaper if it’s done now, rather than later when  years of legislative efforts will have to be retroactively reconstructed.

Reporting Changes in Election Procedures After June 25, 2013

As I mentioned , the Voting Rights Act of 1965 did not provide DOJ with any explicit binding rulemaking authority, and DOJ did not claim rulemaking authority in issuing various guidelines for compliance with the Voting Rights Act. In fact, the administrative procedures for Section 5 preclearance submissions were  alternatives to judicial review and therefore not binding on any of the covered jurisdictions.

At least one scholar has speculated that the DOJ’s lack of formal rulemaking authority may have further undermined potential Supreme Court deference to DOJ as an executive agency, and in fact created an atmosphere of “anti-deference.” See Arpit K. Garg, A Deference Theory of Section Five (Draft as of April 1, 2012), online at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2209636; Jennifer Nou, Sub-Regulating Elections (Public Law and Legal Theory No. 462, 2014) (Chicago Unbound, University of Chicago Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper), at p. 27.

The reason why the non-binding Section 5 submission “guideline” process was so popular (accounting for well over 99% of all Section 5 preclearances) is that it was so fast and cheap compared to judicial preclearance. With Section 5 reduced to a hollow shell, DOJ now responds to any requests for preclearance with the following boilerplate language:

On June 25, 2013, the United States Supreme Court held that the coverage formula in Section 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 1973b(b), as reauthorized by the Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, is unconstitutional and can no longer be used as a basis for subjecting jurisdictions to preclearance under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 1973c. Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. ___, 2013 WL 3184629 (U.S. June 25, 2013) (No. 12-96). Accordingly, no determination will be made under Section 5 by the Attorney General on the specified change. Procedures for the Administration of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 28 C.F.R. 51.35. We further note that this is not a determination on the merits and, therefore, should not be construed as a finding regarding whether the specified change complies with any federal voting rights law.

Lies, Damned Lies, and Databases – The Fight over Discovery in the Texas Voter I.D. Lawsuit

The ongoing lawsuit over Texas picture I.D. requirements has generated a dispute between the State of Texas and the various plaintiffs over how to figure out how many people have been disenfranchised by the new voter I.D. law.

The Department of Justice envisions being able to say with some level of statistical confidence that the Texas law has caused ___________ (insert as precise a number as possible) qualified voters to be disenfranchised, and that of that number, ___________ (insert another precise number) are members of a protected class of minority voters, who otherwise would have been able to vote, but for the state’s legislative action.

This is an oversimplification, of course. With sufficiently accurate information, DOJ could do things like track precinct-by-precinct racial discrimination at the polls, identify specific households targeted for removal from the voter rolls and compare race, identify discrimination against voters with disabilities, create massive cross-referenced charts and enormous four-color maps, pie charts, bar graphs, histograms, computer animation, and so on, all with the aim of overwhelmingly and conclusively demonstrating that the Texas Legislature enacted a blatantly discriminatory law intending to and succeeding at denying the vote to people based on race, minority status, or disability.

The State of Texas, meanwhile, has briefed a number of legal defenses to the DOJ’s requests, including “legislative privilege” (for internal documents relating to the legislative policy-making process), the defense of “we don’t have that,” and the defense of “we can’t get that for you.”

As things currently stand, the judge has issued a series of discovery orders that reflect a perfect compromise, in that the orders leave all sides equally unhappy. DOJ didn’t get the trial delay (to 2015) that it needed to do sophisticated data gathering and technical analysis of the information it hopes to get, and didn’t get an order making Texas give up the data that Texas says it doesn’t have.

The defendant, on the other hand, has one day to turn over all the drivers license, concealed-carry handgun license, and personal i.d. license information to DOJ. The link to the agreement and background information is helpfully provided by the Texas Redistricting blog.

I speculate that DOJ and Texas are so far apart in their discussions of raw data in part because of differences in bureaucratic culture.

Assume for the sake of argument that members of the Texas Legislature collectively and intentionally planned to engage in the wholesale disenfranchisement of minority voters. In so doing, the lawmakers and their staff didn’t need any particular precision or careful data-based legal engineering. It was enough for them to intuit that any increase in the transaction costs associated with elections disproportionately affect the poor and minorities, as well as elderly and first-time voters. They didn’t actually need or want any data about the effect in detail, because the political purpose of the voter I.D. law isn’t to disenfranchise based on careful targeting. It’s to disenfranchise over the long haul.

It’s to put the thumb on the roulette wheel; to count cards at the blackjack table; to nudge the pinball machine without causing it to record a tilt. No subtlety or particular mathematical accuracy is needed or desirable (as any such accuracy would carry with it a discoverable paper trail, but more importantly, would actually cost money to create).

I don’t think the State of Texas is lying to hide its secret stash of high-level sociological evidence of voter disenfranchisement. It doesn’t have any secret stash of high-level sociological evidence of anything, because that would cost money.

Meanwhile, DOJ could argue to Texas with some despair, “you mean you passed a law without knowing what it would actually do?” To which the answer is “Yes. Of course. Have you actually been to our state lately?”